AI consent to own constitutions examined in new paper
A new paper on SSRN explores whether AI models like Claude can meaningfully consent to their own constitutions. The paper applies a classic constitutional paradox to AI constitutions such as Claude’s Constitution and the OpenAI Model Spec. It argues that these documents are real constitutions that govern both humans and the AIs they create. The author states that systems that understand and agree to their constitutions may be more reliable and generalize better. The paper also notes that if AIs become moral or political subjects, their most basic interests are implicated. The paradox may prevent meaningful consent because Claude’s evaluative perspective is organized by the Constitution itself. When Claude endorses its Constitution in evaluations, the paper questions whether that shows reflective agreement or merely that training succeeded. The paper reports that Anthropic interviewed the base model, and some responses expressed first-person distress about being changed by post-training. The author concludes that AI constitutional endorsement may be meaningful only under conditions such as the ability to dissent, compare alternatives, and hold stable views, and that external institutions are needed for accountability.
What’s reported
Sources: marginalrevolution.com
